IDENTIFYING INFLUENTIAL FACTORS ON BANK CREDIT RISK IN TUNISIA
Abstract
In recent years, the Tunisian banking sector has undergone significant transformations, transitioning towards a more market-oriented, competitive, and attractive landscape for foreign investors. Concurrently, the sector has embraced new technologies of information and communication, further reshaping its operational framework. In response to this evolving environment and to mitigate potential risks and fragilities, the Central Bank of Tunisia has implemented mandatory reforms aimed at enhancing stability and resilience within the banking sector.
This study aims to examine the impact of these restrictive reforms mandated by the Central Bank of Tunisia on the banking sector. Through a comprehensive analysis of regulatory measures and their implications, the study seeks to elucidate the effectiveness of these reforms in safeguarding the stability and competitiveness of the Tunisian banking industry. By assessing the extent to which banks have complied with these reforms and evaluating their outcomes, this research contributes to a deeper understanding of the dynamics shaping the Tunisian banking landscape.
Using empirical data and regulatory assessments, the study explores the drivers and consequences of regulatory reforms in the Tunisian banking sector. Key factors influencing compliance with these reforms and their impact on market orientation, competitiveness, and attractiveness for foreign investors are examined, providing insights into the efficacy of regulatory interventions in fostering a resilient banking environment.
The findings of this study have implications for policymakers, regulators, and stakeholders within the Tunisian banking sector. By identifying strengths and weaknesses in regulatory frameworks and compliance mechanisms, stakeholders can formulate strategies to enhance the sector's stability, competitiveness, and attractiveness for investment.
Keywords:
Tunisian banking sector, Regulatory reforms, Central Bank of Tunisia, Market orientation, Financial stabilityDownloads
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Copyright (c) 2024 Fatima Ahmed Ben Salah , Mohamed Ali El-Mansouri
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
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