THE ROLE OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS) IN THE LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR: A CASE STUDY OF THE ECOWAS MONITORING GROUP (ECOMOG)

[1]Shiru, Umar Toyin

Abstract

This study examined the role of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in the Liberian civil war. This section discusses the causes of the war, ECOMOG intervention, difficulties in ECOMOG operations, and the impact it has on the country. There have been many works on ECOWAS, ECOMOG, and Liberia, but none has really fully focused on why ECOWAS, which was set up for economic integration in West Africa, would involve itself in the political affairs of its member state, as this work did.

This study employed a qualitative research methodology and a historical/documentary research design. In-depth oral interviews were conducted to gather primary and empirical data. In addition, both published and unpublished materials were used. Data analysis involved examining the primary and secondary data collected using within-methods triangulation techniques. The primary and secondary data for this study were analyzed using content analyses.

The objectives of this study were to examine the reasons for the intervention of ECOMOG in Liberia and to assess ECOMOG peace operations in Liberia. However, to satisfy these objectives, the questions were what were the reasons for ECOMOG intervention in Liberia and has it prevented the re-emergence of conflict in the area.

This study has evaluated the effectiveness of ECOWAS in regional peace and security issues, there are key issues worthy of consideration and they are: the geopolitics of West Africa and its constraints on the development and practice of common foreign and security policies; the leadership role of Nigeria; the role and contribution of extra-regional actors such as the former colonial powers and the UN; and the quality of leadership of both ECOWAS and ECOMOG.

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[1] Employee And Labor Relations Officer, Nigerian Ports Authority

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1   Background of the study

At the end of the Cold War in 1989-1990, Africa was no longer a strategic stake for superpowers. The confrontation between the West and the East that had taken place and allowed nondemocratic and corrupt regimes to exist despite legitimate claims of their population was over. Some African countries experience conflicts of different magnitudes knowing that their regime is no longer supported abroad and are agitated for democratic governance. Some governments (Mali, Niger, Senegal among others) did not see this in this way and tried to keep ruling their countries as they had in the past. Then, with the proliferation of arms resulting, in part, from the fall of the Soviet bloc, many civil wars occurred in Africa (Berman and Sams 2000: 84). Against the background of the decrease in superpower involvement in regional conflicts in the 1990s, the positive diplomatic initiative of galvanizing the West African sub-region into a peacekeeping international police force represented by the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) became imperative for the ECOWAS ceasefire supranational organization, but the regional and sub-regional security structures that must be put in place must be those that can respond effectively to the challenges of protecting the sanctity of borders, of infusing commitment to democratic ideals and ethos, and of imposing arms control policy in the sub-region. ECOWAS therefore performed the vacuum-filling functions of peacekeeping operations in Liberia out of expediency (Vogt and Aminu, 1996: 321)

 The laudable objective of achieving a conflict-free sub-regional community through the integration of the economies of member countries and the creation of a common market, ECOWAS, has been threatened by the occurrence of protracted fratricidal wars in West Africa. At the end of 1990, at least 15 African wars took a tremendous toll on daily casualties. Five out of these 15 wars raged in the West African sub-region: the Liberian civil war (1989-1997), the Tuareg insurrection in Mali and Niger (2007-2009) and the Casamance insurrection in Senegal (1982-2014) (Gerdes, 2013). Although these conflicts were internal wars, their cross-boundary ramifications embittered relations between neighboring states. This metamorphosis of Africa in the 1990s into a zone of instability and the dramatic withdrawal of superpowers as well as the former colonial powers from intervention in Africa provided the stimulating impulse for regional supranational authorities like ECOWAS to assume greater responsibilities for regional peace and security (Vogt and Aminu, 1996: 322). From the catalog of disruptive wars, ECOWAS has since recognized the symbiotic relation that exists between regional security and the harmonious development of the economies of its member states (Vogt and Aminu, 1996: 322).

Liberia, as a result of its political history, has distinguished it from every other African country. It was founded by freed American slaves in 1822. It is the oldest republic in Africa and gained independence in 1847. The new settlers, known as Americo-Liberians, ruled Liberia for 133 years under the True Whig Party, also known as the Liberian Whig Party, which is the oldest political party in Liberia. Founded in 1869 by primarily Americo-Liberians, the party dominated Liberian politics from 1878 to 1980 (Burrowes 2004:312). The settlers established a feudal or primitive structure with all social, economic, and political power in their hands. In Christianity's name, indigenous peoples (Grebo, Kru among others) have been subjected to various human rights abuses, including forced labor and marginalization. All these (forced labor and marginalization) led to hardship and cultural division while the ruling class prospered. By the 1970s, this once unassailable power structure began to crumble as a new constituency of disaffected, often foreign-educated Liberians joined forces in various opposition groups and began voicing their demands for reform. Their dissatisfaction culminated with the "rice riots of 1979", 2000-strong protesters were sparked off by a 50% increase in the local staple. This riot/protest turned into chaos when

police began to fire at the crowd, killing more than 100 protesters. It was this growing discontent that paved the way for the military coup d'état in 1980 that brought Samuel Doe, a Krahn from Tuzon County, to power. Although Doe himself later became a symbol of greed, exploitation, and corruption, the new president's bloody debut was initially welcomed by the majority of Liberians as an end to more than a century of colonization. The years that followed were marked by mounting unrest due to an increasingly Krahn-dominated authoritarian regime that promoted joint militarization and ethnically based politics and ruled a sagging economy characterized by increasing inflation and growing unemployment. The authoritarian nature of Doe's regime and his failure to listen to and carry out other members of his group that helped him to power led to the Thomas Quinwonkpa coup. The major factor that caused Liberia to plunge into a senseless war was the authoritarian nature of Doe's regime. Taylor capitalized on this opportunity to launch his rebellion against Doe (Fawole 2007).

 Unfortunately, Taylor himself misruled the country when he was in power. After the execution of Quiwonkpa, Doe's soldiers, the Krahn-dominated Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) began a bloody campaign of reprisal killings, mainly targeting Gios and Manos, closely related ethnic groups that reside in the same region of Liberia. The Liberian conflict began on December 24, 1989, when rebel leader Charles Taylor invaded Nimba County from the Liberian-Ivorian border area. Charles Taylor's movement is referred to as the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). The AFL responded with a ruthless counterinsurgency campaign, which included the indiscriminate killing of civilians, burning of villages, raping of women, and looting of properties (Eric 2005).

What followed was a slow-burning seven years of war fueled by the formation of one ethnic-based rival armed group after another. By 1992, the NPFL, a splinter group, the Independent National Patriotic Front (INPLF), which captured and killed Doe, had already reached its peak and faded. However, the United Liberation Movement for Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), formed by Liberian refugees in Sierra Leone who had been loyal to Doe, was making gains from across the border into southwestern Liberia. In 1993, the Liberia Peace Council (LPC), a Krahn offshoot of the AFL, challenged the NPFL and gained significant control over the southeast of the country. From 1989 to 1997, there were numerous failed efforts to restore peace and security in Liberia. These eight years were marked by brutal ethnic killings and massive human rights violations against civilians. Thousands of Liberians were killed, and many were also subjected to torture, rape, and sexual assault. This (abuse) resulted in massive displacement inside and outside the country (Paul 1999).

On July 19, 1997, Charles Taylor, the former leader of the NPFL, was elected president of the country. Unfortunately, the Taylor government was famous for corruption and human rights abuses. Charles Taylor's mis-governance or misrule widened divisions and deepened popular resentments caused by civil war. State power was regularly used for the personal enrichment of government officials with little or no accountability to the Liberian citizenry. Under Taylor's presidency, the Liberian economy contracted rather than expanded, and neo-patrimonialism ensued. During this period, the Liberian economy was stagnant. Another armed group, the Liberian United for Reconstruction and Democracy (LURD), launched an assault on Taylor's soldiers from neighboring Guinea in 2000. This was the fifth outbreak of serious violence in Liberia since Taylor's election as president. Unfortunately, Liberia was plunged into civil war for another five years. In this context, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), whose first mission was economic integration, deployed in June 1990 in Liberia, the first West African Peace enforcement operation, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), to halt the civil war (Berman and Sams, 2000: 88).

The ECOWAS decision to intervene in Liberia's civil war can be seen as a novel move. ECOWAS was initially established in 1975 by a joint initiative of Nigeria and Togo to promote economic and social cooperation and integration within the West African sub-region. Why should a multilateral organization established for economic integration assume responsibility for collective security and the management of conflicts in the sub-region?

Neither in the aims of the Community nor in the modalities for achieving them has there been any mention of interposition of force, armed or unarmed (Vogt, 2002:206). This does not mean that the Community cannot address political or security issues that could affect economic stability in the region. In Africa, the dominance of security issues and concerns in regional politics make it more imperative that economic relations be harnessed on a sound political and security foundation as the collapse of law and order render the pursuit of the objectives of economic integration difficult, if not impossible (Vogt, 2002:207). The convergence between economic and political matters informed the signing in 1978 of the Protocol on Non-Aggression, adopted at the Third Conference of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS held in Dakar, Senegal on 22 April 1978 and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defense adopted in Freetown, Sierra Leone, on 29 May 1981. The Protocol on Non-Aggression states that the Community "cannot attain its objectives save in an atmosphere of peace and harmonious understanding among Member States." This affirms the non-use of force contained in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter and respect for the sovereignty of each member state. The Protocol however adds that "each member state shall refrain from committing, encouraging or condoning acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other member state." At the same time, member states were "to prevent non-resident foreigners from using its territory as a base for committing (these) acts" (ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression, 1978: 18).

Although the 1978 Protocol upholds the principle of nonintervention, it neither excludes the right of individual or collective self-defense nor the possibility of enforcement actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Although valuable, the Protocol was limited to only addressing aggression between member states. It made no reference to aggression coming from outside the Community or internal conflicts. The Protocol was subsequently supplemented by the Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense and addressed these omissions. Here member states were "firmly resolved to safeguard and consolidate the independence and sovereignty of member states against foreign intervention." Members also declared that any "armed threat or aggression directed at fellow members shall constitute a threat or aggression against the entire Community. In the case of 'internal armed conflict within any member state engineered and supported from the outside' and which is 'likely to endanger the peace and security' in the region, the Protocol empowers ECOWAS to initiate armed or collective intervention. Where armed intervention (Article 9) occurs, the Protocol empowers the Authority (Head of ECOWAS) to decide on the expediency of military action (Article 6(3)). If necessary, the Authority shall interpose the Allied Armed Force of the Community with the troops engaged in the conflict (Article 17). Article 13(1,2) allows the creation of a community army composed of troops earmarked from national units. This Protocol has been cited by its proponents as providing the basis for the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia (ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression, 1978).

The question of who or which authority had the power to order military intervention in ECOWAS member states is controversial. The question has been addressed from various angles by government apologists in different states trying to justify their actions on security and humanitarian grounds, as well as by analysts and researchers who have tried to unravel the mysteries behind the operation. This is because the body that carried out the peacekeeping exercise was established for promoting economic integration and development rather than for security purposes. It is however important to identify the parameters on which decisions to intervene are based (Fawole 2001).

1.2 Statement of the Problem

ECOMOG has intervened in intrastate conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Côte d' Ivoire. Even though these interventions did little to eradicate the root cause of the conflicts in these countries, they halted the carnage and created an atmosphere in which peace could be restored and political dialog to begin. Given the background of ECOWAS as an economic union designed to promote economic growth and its performance to

date, expanding its mission to include security responsibilities presents numerous political, legal, military, and logistical challenges that adversely affect ECOWAS prospects for sub-regional security. This study seeks to answer the justification for ECOMOG intervention in Liberia. The role of ECOMOG in the Liberian civil war was also examined.

1.3   Objectives of the Study

Many views have emerged regarding ECOWAS's security roles and activities in West Africa and the organization's approaches toward managing and resolving West African conflicts. The overarching objective of this study is to critically examine the role of ECOMOG in the Liberian civil war.

The specific objectives of this study are as follows:

Examine the reasons for ECOMOG intervention in Liberia were examined.

Access to ECOMOG operations in Liberia

1.4   Research Questions

1.   What were the reasons for the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia?

2.   Has the ECOMOG intervention prevented the re-emergence of conflict in Liberia?

1.5   The significance of the Study

This study is important to scholars and researchers in the broad fields of international and African regional security, and to organizations and agencies concerned with African security. This study will also assess the justification of ECOMOG deployment in Liberia, thereby helping the understanding of the many reasons why ECOMOG needs to be effectively carried out in order to rescue the war-bound country. It seeks to extend the frontier of knowledge and understanding in this field of scientific inquiry and, finally, it also seeks to contribute to the body of policy analysis on ECOWAS and West African security.

1.6   Scope of the Study

This research study discusses the Liberian civil war and examines the reasons for ECOWAS intervention and the subsequent deployment of ECOMOG. This study analyzes the role of ECOMOG in the establishment of peace and security in Liberia and clarifies whether ECOMOG deployment was a poor choice of role model for future African peace operations or an applauded mission. This Study covers the period between 1990 when ECOMOG was deployed by ECOWAS and 1997 when the country experienced a new democratic dispensation following the end of the first Liberian civil war.

1.7   Limitations of the Study

Originally, the researcher made an attempt to visit Liberia to obtain firsthand information on the study, but due to time and financial constraints, that was not realized, so some of those interviewed were also reluctant to give out the needed information. In addition, some personnel were supposed to be interviewed, but they were not available. However, these constraints do not necessarily hinder the outcomes of the research.

1.8   Key Terms

It is essential to define key concepts in this study. This exercise will serve as a basis for a better understanding of this study and will also demonstrate how the exercise is being used in this research.

1.   **Conflict**: The word "Conflict" is derived from the Latin word "Confligere" which means to clash or engage in a fight. The term refers to confrontation between individuals or groups resulting from incompatible goals. Everyone has their own perspectives, interests, resources, aspirations, and fears. We each have times when we feel that others have hurt us and times when we are moved to act against real or perceived injustices. Conflict is manifested through adversarial social action, involving two or more actors expressing differences. Sometimes, conflicts arise because of people's inability to manage differences.

2.   **Peace**: The term "Peace" has many interpretations. It is often misunderstood as the direct opposite of conflict, although it can be positive or negative. The word 'peace' is derived from the original Latin word 'pax', which means a pact, a control or an agreement to end the war or any dispute and conflict between two people, two nations or two antagonistic groups of people. Peace is generally defined as the absence of war, fear, conflict, anxiety, suffering, and violence. It is about peaceful coexistence. Peace can be seen from many perspectives. It can be freedom from war, tranquility (the calm and quiet state from noise or disturbance), and harmony (Freedom from maintaining a just order in the society and resolution of conflict by non-violent means conflict or disagreement among people or groups). It is primarily concerned with creating and maintaining a just order in society and resolving conflicts through nonviolent means. Positive peace means a state of tranquility, calm, repose, quietness, harmony, friendship, amity, concord, peaceful or friendly relation, public order, pacification, spiritual content, reconciliation, serenity, security, social justice, and bliss, while negative peace means an absence of war, conflict, hostility, agitation, disturbance, disagreement or quarrel, struggle, violence, terrorism, civil strife or civil commotion, social disorder, among others, and an absence of mental disturbance, such as anxiety worry, restlessness.

3.   **Civil war: A civil** war is a situation of violent conflicts between two or more parties to control political authority in a state or part of it. Such conflicts can take the form of conventional wars, which are prolonged battles. A civil war is a violent conflict between a state and one or more organized non-state actors in the state's territory. Civil wars are thus distinguished from interstate conflicts (in which states fight other states), violent conflicts or riots not involving states (sometimes labeled inter-communal conflicts), and state repression against individuals who cannot be considered an organized or cohesive group, including genocides, and similar violence by non-state actors, such as terrorism or violent crime.

4.   **Peace enforcement**: Peace enforcement is an operation that does not necessarily require the consent of the host state or other parties to the conflict. Peace enforcement typically presupposes the existence of a known aggressor/aggressor identified by the UN Security Council (UNSC) and requires the activation or authorization of the use of force to impose the will of the UNSC on the aggressor(s) (United Nations, 2008)**.**

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1   Introduction
This chapter reviews extant literature on peacekeeping, civil war, and ECOWAS peace enforcement operations.
2.2   Review of the major concepts
This chapter reviewed some existing literature on armed conflict, the Liberian civil war, and ECOWAS' peace intervention and operations. This study, therefore, reviewed key concepts such as 'conflict, peace, and peace enforcement that are central to this study.
2.2.1   Conflict
In his study of conflict, Coser (2002) defined conflict as a struggle over values, claims to status, power, and scarce resources in which the aims of the conflicting parties are not only to gain the desired value but to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals. Coser asserts that such conflict occurs between individuals and sometimes collectively. Whenever one party perceives that one or more goals or means of achieving a goal or preference are being threatened or hindered by the activities of one or more parties, conflict is said to arise. This party may be seeking to expand into the same field of influence or behaviors. Coser concluded that conflict is common in every plural society. Otite (2002) supported Coser's assertion by arguing that conflict arises from individuals and groups' pursuit of divergent interests, goals, and aspirations in defined social and physical environments. Otite

further argued that changes in the social environment, such as contestable access to new political positions or perception of new resources arising from development in the physical environment, are some of the machinery used by individuals and groups to achieve their selfish goals, thereby placing some groups or individuals at a less disadvantaged position. He posits that conflict has its positive side as an agent for social change and gives a hint about how and why it needs to be resolved.

Aja (2007) described conflict as involving two or more parties in opposition to interests, principles, practices, or strategies. This means that conflict reflects a clash of interests or goals between parties, which may be individuals, groups of individuals, ethnic groups, or states. Aja (2007) further stated that conflict reflects determined action or struggle over a goal, which may be subtle, manifest, or imaginary. In essence, he portrays conflict as an attitude, behavior, action, or process that introduces strain and stress in the relationship between two or more parties at the attainment of a set of interests or goals.

David (2006) explained conflict as an intrinsic and inevitable part of human existence. David defined conflict as "the pursuit of incompatible interest and goals by groups." According to David, conflict therefore occurs because of differences in ideas, opinions, values, and principles. This divergence of interest and opinion eventually leads to tension, discord, and quarrel, if not properly managed. Burton (1993) explained that conflict is the range of arguments, tensions, and violent conflicts that occur both within and between states. Conflict can therefore arise from social relationships in which the parties involved are in close proximity.

In summary, conflict has brought satisfaction and smiles to humans and society at some point, and at other times, it has brought tears, anguish, and devastation to lives and societies, depending on the type of conflict. Conflict occurs as a result of the incompatibility of ideas, goals and objectives, philosophy, ways of life, differences in opinions, changes in behavior, and even emotions. Conflict could be positive as long as it brings the desired positive changes that it has set out to achieve, and it could be negative when the desired changes are not achieved, coupled with some elements of destruction. Without conflict, there will be no need for intervention and enforcement. Therefore, the existence of conflict brings about the need for intervention and peace enforcement.

2.2.2   Peace

Mail (2000) described peace in six ways: as the absence of war (absence of direct violence), justice and development (absence of structural violence), respect and tolerance between people, traitility or inner peace (spiritual peace), wholeness and making whole (being complete), and Gaia (harmony or balance in and with the ecosystem).

Aja (2007), in his study titled "Basic Concepts, Issues and Strategies of Peace and Conflict Resolution" argues that peace is a relative condition of security friendly climate that allows individuals and group relations to achieve progressive order and stability. Furthermore, he argued that peace does not mean the absence of conflict or war. This reflects the security system that frees individuals or groups of people from fear and danger of losing such situations of violence, open abuses of power, or fundamental human rights. Absolute human rights as life, liberty and prosperity. Aja asserts that peace cannot exist in situations of violence, open abuses of power, or fundamental human rights. Therefore, the scholar defines peace as the prime value of human existence. Aja further outlined what he called 'sustainable peace' to include; good governance, good followership, non-violent value system, preservation of human rights including prime sacredness of life and liberty, fear of the sovereign creator, respect for man, security measures to guarantee the absence of fear or threat to the subjects and core value society, free flow of communication as the supreme strategy of conflict transformation and conflict resolution, sensitiveness to the early warning conflict signals and a pragmatic response to forestall their graduation into the conflict scenario, religious tolerance that guarantees to each the natural liberty to any form of worship, creating an

institutional mechanism for the promotion of more collaborative activities than discord and introducing appropriate remedies timely, where applicable.

In conceptualizing 'Peace' Oke's (2006) defined 'Peace' in several ways. Philosophically, Oke defined peace as the pre-corruption state of man in society. This connotes a state of perfection is an earthly expression of God's Kingdom that is yet uncorrupted. Sociologically, Oke sees peace as a condition of social harmony in which no social conflict exists, and individuals and groups can meet their needs and expectations. Oke further argued that this can be achieved by two broad sociological responses: structural-functionalist and dialectical materialist. The scholar explained that structural functionalism is a tradition of social analysis that views society as a mosaic of functions and structures that perform them. Furthermore, Oke stated that for a society to survive, it needs to educate its people, produce goods, govern its affairs, and provide security for its members. All these are structural functions of a society, and they necessitate some structures such as schools, industries, parliaments, courts, and armed forces, among others. Oke argued that according to the University for Peace; Peace is a political condition that makes justice possible. Oke sees peace as the institutionalization of the political structure. He concluded that peace involves activities that are directly or indirectly linked to increasing development and reducing conflict, both within specific societies and in the wider international community.

David (2006) also saw peace as a prime value in contemporary Africa. David agrees that peace is the absence of war, but added that peace is based on justice and development, respect, tolerance between people, and peace as a whole. Peace was also defined by Bondurant (1958) as equality, which describes a society or relationship that operates harmoniously. This is commonly understood as the absence of hostilities or the existence of healthy or newly healed interpersonal or international relationships, safety in matters of social or economic welfare, acknowledgment of equality and fairness in political relationships and in world matters. Peace can be hindered by insecurity, social justice, economic inequality, political and religious radicalism, and acute racism and nationalism.

2.3   A Brief History of the Liberian Civil War

Liberia is a unique country because of its political history, which has distinguished it from every other country in Africa. It was founded by freed American slaves in 1822. It is the oldest republic in Africa, and it gained independence in 1847(Radelet S. 2007). The new settlers, known as Americo-Liberians, ruled Liberia for 133 years. The settlers established a feudal or primitive structure with all social, economic, and political power in their hands. In Christianity's name, indigenous populations have been subjected to various human rights abuses, including forced labor and marginalization. All this led to hardship and cultural division while the ruling class prospered. By the 1970s, this once unassailable power structure began to crumble as a new constituency of disaffected, often foreign-educated Liberians joined forces in various opposition groups (Grebo, Kru) and began voicing their demands for reform. Their dissatisfaction culminated with the "rice riots of 1979" when 2000-strong protesters, sparked off by a 50% increase in the local staple, staged a protest. This riot/protest turned into chaos when police began to fire at the crowd, killing more than 100 protesters. It was this growing discontent that paved the way for the military coup d'état in 1980 that brought Samuel Doe, an ethnic Krahn from Tuzon County, to power. Although Doe himself later became a symbol of greed, exploitation, and corruption, the new president's bloody debut was initially welcomed by the majority of Liberians as an end to more than a century of 'internal' colonization.

Samuel Doe took power in a popular coup in 1980 against William R. Tolbert, becoming the first Liberian president of non-Americo-Liberian descent. Doe established a military regime called the People's Redemption Council and enjoyed early support from a larger number of indigenous Liberian ethnic groups who had been excluded from power since the founding of the country in 1822 by freed American slaves. Any hope that Doe

would improve the way Liberia was run was put aside as he quickly clamped down on opposition, fueled by his paranoia over a counter-coup attempt against him. As promised, Doe held elections in 1985 and won the presidency by just enough of a margin to avoid a runoff. However, international monitors condemned the election as fraudulent. Thomas Quiwonkpa, the former Commanding General of the Armed Forces of Liberia who Doe had demoted and forced to flee the country, attempted to overthrow Doe's regime from neighboring Sierra Leone. The coup attempt failed, and Quiwonkpa was killed and allegedly eaten. His body was publicly exhibited on the grounds of the Executive Mansion in Monrovia shortly after his death. Large-scale government crackdowns were followed in Nimba County, Zuleyee in the north of the country, against the Gio and Mano ethnic groups where most coup plotters came from. The mistreatment of the Gio and Mano ethnic groups fueled ethnic tensions in Liberia, which had already been rising due to Doe's preferential treatment of his own group, the Krahn.

However, Charles Taylor, who had left Doe's government after being accused of embezzlement, assembled a group of rebels in Côte d'Ivoire (mostly ethnic Gios and Manos who felt persecuted by Doe), who later became known as the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). They invaded Nimba County on December 24, 1989. The Liberian Army retaliated against the entire population of the region, attacking unarmed civilians and burning villages. Many lefts as refugees to Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire, but opposition to Doe was inflamed. Prince Johnson, an NPFL fighter, split to form his own guerrilla force soon after crossing the border, based on the Gio tribe and named the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL).

2.3.1 The Causes of the Liberian Civil War

The Liberian civil wars were fought in two phases, although the second war was a continuation of the first. The first phase of the war was fought between 1989 and 1997, while the second was between 1999 and 2003. These wars can be said to have occurred as a result of the long marginalization of the indigenous Liberians by the Americo-Liberians, thereby making the indigenous Liberians feel that an opportunity to take over power would help improve all their previous sufferings. However, things didn't turn out as expected for indigenous Liberians because Samuel Doe came into power. This factor cannot be directly attributed to the immediate cause of the war. Other factors such as the misgovernance of Samuel Doe and some other strong reasons will be discussed in this section.

In primary research conducted by Vinck, Pham, and Kreutzer (2011), these scholars stated that 63% of surveyed adult Liberians identified greed and corruption as the causes of the conflict. Another 40% mentioned identity and tribal divisions, while less than one in three adult Liberians mentioned poverty, and 27% blamed the war on inequalities. According to Vinck, Pham, and Kreutzer (2011), nearly one in five of the respondents said they did not know what the root causes of the conflicts were, and few mentioned land issues 3 per cent or food issues 1 per cent. The results on the direct causes of violence perceived by the population may not highlight structural deficiencies that allow greed, corruption, or inequalities to exist and eventually lead to conflict, but nevertheless, they suggest that conflict results partly from elites' behavior.

2.3.2 Liberian Civil War (1989-1997)

Charles Taylor organized and trained indigenous northerners on the Ivory Coast. During Doe's regime, Taylor served in the Liberian Government's General Services Agency, acting 'as its de facto director'. He fled to the United States in 1983 amid what Stephan Ellis describes as the "increasingly menacing atmosphere in Monrovia," shortly before Thomas Quiwonkpa, Doe's chief lieutenant, fled into exile himself. Doe requested Taylor's extradition for embezzling $900,000 of Liberian government funds. Taylor was thus arrested in the United S, ands and after 16 months, he left a Massachusetts prison in circumstances that remain unclear.

The NPFL initially encountered plenty of support within Nimba County, which had endured most of Samuel Doe's wrath after the 1985 coup. When Taylor and his 100 rebels re-entered Liberia in 1989, thousands of Gio

and Mano joined them on Christmas Eve. While these formed the core of his rebel army, many Liberians of other ethnic backgrounds joined him as well. Doe responded by sending two AFL battalions, including the 1st Infantry Battalion, to Nimba in December 1989-January 1990, apparently under then-Colonel Hezekiah Bowen. The AFL acted in a brutal and scorched-earth manner, quickly alienating local people. The rebel invasion soon pitted the ethnic Krahn sympathetic to the Doe regime against those who were victimized by it, the Gio and the Mano. Thousands of civilians were massacred on both sides. Hundreds of thousands fled their homes. The Monrovia Church massacre was carried out by approximately 30 ethnic Krahn government soldiers, killing 600 civilians in St. Peter's Lutheran Church, Monrovia, on 29 July 1990, the worst single atrocity of the First Liberian Civil War. By May 1990, the AFL had been forced back to Gbarnga, still under the control of Bowen's troops, but they lost the town to an NPFL assault on 28 May. By June 1990, Taylor's forces had laid siege to Monrovia. In July 1990, Prince Yormie Johnson split from Taylor to form the Independent National Patriotic Front (INPFL). The INPFL and NPFL continued their siege of Monrovia, which the AFL defended. Johnson quickly took control of parts of Monrovia, prompting the evacuation of foreign nationals and diplomats by the US Navy in August.

In August 1990, the 16-member Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) agreed to deploy a joint military intervention force, the Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), and placed it under Nigerian leadership. The mission later included troops from non-ECOWAS countries, including Uganda and Tanzania. ECOMOG's objectives were to impose a ceasefire; help Liberians establish an interim government until elections could be held; stop the killing of innocent civilians; and ensure the safe evacuation of foreign nationals. ECOMOG also sought to prevent the conflict from spreading into neighboring states, which share a complex history of state, economic, and ethnolinguistic social relations with Liberia. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) attempted to persuade Doe to resign and go into exile, but despite his weak position, besieged in his mansion, he refused. ECOMOG, an ECOWAS intervention force, arrived at the Freeport of Monrovia on August 24, 1990, landing from Nigerian and Ghanaian vessels.

On September 9, 1990, Doe visited the barely established, newly arrived ECOMOG headquarters in the FreePort of Monrovia. Stephen Ellis says that his motive was to lay a complaint that the ECOMOG commander had not paid a courtesy call to Doe, the head of state. However, the exact circumstances that led to Doe's visit to the Free Port are still unclear. Doe was under pressure to accept exile outside Liberia. However, after Doe arrived, a large rebel force led by Prince Johnson's INPFL arrived at headquarters and attacked Doe's party. Doe was captured and taken to the INPFL's Caldwell base. He was brutally tortured before being killed and dismembered. His torture and execution were videotaped by his captors. Johnson and Taylor's INPFL continued to struggle for control of Monrovia in the months that followed. With the absence of military discipline and bloodshed throughout the capital region, members of ECOWAS created the Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to restore order. The force comprised 4,000 troops from Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, the Gambia, and Guinea. ECOMOG succeeded in bringing Taylor and Johnson to agree to its intervention, but Taylor's forces engaged it in the port area of Monrovia.

2.3.3 ECOMOG Peace Enforcement Operation

The inception of ECOMOG and its operations have been seen as a positive contribution to ECOWAS' efforts to resolve intra-state conflicts in the West African sub-region. In his book titled The *Causes of War and the Consequences of Peacekeeping in Africa (2002),* Ricardo Rene Laremont hails the ECOWAS's move to use ECOMOG to intervene intra-state. He added that it is only the establishment of effective security arrangements for conflict resolutions that can ensure Africa's stability and development. Laremont believes that developed countries are no longer willing to directly contribute troops to military intervention forces in Africa. In his book, he suggests that the US and France's proposal of *Reinforcement des Capacities Africanes de Maintien de la Paix*

(RECAMP) was an indirect way of asking the African continent to be ready to resolve its own conflicts. These programs were aimed at training selected African military to improve their capacity in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. Despite the initial problems of ECOMOG in Liberia in 1990, the intervention force has become a model for all sub-regions to emulate.

In an article entitled "Every Car or Moving Object Gone: The ECOMOG Intervention in Liberia," published in *African Studies Quarterly,* Christopher Tuck discussed the creation of ECOMOG through to its exit from Liberia in 1998. It describes the Liberian conflict as an off-shoot of the demise of the Cold War, in which approximately 200,000 civilians died and 1.2 million people were displaced out of a prewar population of 2.5 million (Tuck 2000). This section discusses the reasons for ECOMOG deployment and the difficulties it faced. Its strengths and weaknesses are also discussed in this paper. The final part of the article subscribes to the school of thought that despite ECOMOG's difficulties, the outcome of its efforts during the Liberian conflict (as of 1997) was commendable since it halted the senseless carnage in the country that began in 1990.

The establishment of ECOMOG is also seen as an emerging, indigenous African peacekeeping capability. Rasheed Draman and David Carment (2003) sided with this school of thought in their paper, "Managing Chaos in the West African Sub-region: Assessing the Role of ECOMOG in Liberia." The first section of their paper traces the development of ECOMOG. In the second section, the interviewees argued that the course of ECOWAS diplomacy in Liberia was fraught with problems and resulted in many shortcomings. The paper concludes by stating that ECOMOG's efforts in Liberia helped stabilize the sub-region as a whole. In his document, *Waging War to Keep Peace*, Francis Adu-Amanfoh (2007) stressed the shift from the traditional means of peacekeeping missions to missions that began after the end of the Cold War. He explains that second generation peacekeeping has gained importance such that conventional forces must be conversant with its concepts and principles. The natures of conflicts since the collapse of the former Soviet Union have taken a very different form, and these demands are more than traditional means of conflict resolution. Adu-Amanfoh recounts that recent conflicts in the sub-region are more intrastate than interstate. The conflicts are therefore value-based, deep-rooted, and less amenable to conciliation, with a higher possibility of spreading into other territories if not checked. In conclusion, the author asserts that peace enforcement or military intervention as a tool for resolving intrastate conflicts has remained.

2.3.4   Challenges of ECOMOG Peace Operation

The ECOMOG operation was never probably easy, given the complexity of the situation in Liberia. While ethnicity was much less of a factor early on in the struggle, as in Bosnia, the manipulation of ethnic differences by faction leaders for political purposes led to conflicts that were increasingly fought along ethnic lines. In addition to embittering the fighting, this led to a rather "zero-sum" approach to negotiations (New African. 1995). Cease-fires, for example, were often used in a calculated fashion to provide breathing spaces during which to consolidate and re-arm. In its early incarnation, the civil war pitted the troops of Doe's Liberian government, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), against the insurgents of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) under Charles Taylor, the former predominantly drawn from the Krahn ethnic group, and the latter from the Gio and Mano tribes. As the war continued, the situation became increasingly confused, as new groups often appeared and existing groups were fragmented. The NPFL, for example, spawned the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), and the Central Revolutionary Council. A new group, ULIMO (the United Movement for Democracy and Liberation in Liberia), emerged in 1991, only to fragment into a Krahn faction (ULIMO-J under Roosevelt Johnston) and a Mandingo faction (ULIMO-K under Alhaji Kromah). By 1995, there were at least eight major factions and many more minor factions (Anthony C 1995). The progressive splintering of the militias (which was caused by, but also contributed to, the longevity of the conflict) created a range of problems (Paul B

1999). As in Bosnia, there was a pronounced shift toward "localism" within militia groups in which weak central control led to the emergence of warlords whose objectives extended no further than personal gain; for example, economic motives such as the control of diamond mining and rubber plantations became an important dynamic in the continuation of the war. This made the formulation of an overarching political solution very difficult. Moreover, ethnic hatred and the progressive fractionalization of the militias made concrete advances on issues such as disarmament and demobilization difficult. Since weapons and troops were the basis of faction power in Liberia, agreements regarding the handing over of weapons and so forth could only succeed if every faction, however small, was included (a problem also experienced in Somalia). might seem to have missed the point. However, ECOMOG provides a poor peacekeeping role model. In terms of intent, method and outcomes, the ECOMOG operation embodied serious flaws that make it an imperfect model for building future African intervention capabilities. In reality, such difficulties meant that some factions excluded themselves from political agreements; for example, the Lofa Defense Force (allied to Taylor) and the Bong Defense Front (allied to Kromah) were not signatories to the Cotonou Agreement of 1993. Neither was the Liberian Peace Council, which operated in NPFL areas with clandestine support from the AFL. The situation was further complicated by strife in Sierra Leone, one consequence of which was that Sierra Leonean resistance groups based themselves in Liberian territory; these competed with ULIMO for control of territory and resources. The overall situation was also exacerbated by compositing the militias. At least a quarter of the soldiers were children (Time Magazine, 1995), who, as the conflict progressed, naturally found it harder to integrate back into society. Warlords also vied for a predominant position within their ethnic group, as was the case with the struggle between the Krahn groups of Roosevelt Johnson's ULIMO-J and George Boley`s LPC. This provided yet another autonomous dynamic behind the war. Thus, as the war became more prolonged, the nature of the war shifted, complicating ECOMOG`s attempts to develop a coherent strategy and encouraging "mission creep". At face value, the question of whether ECOMOG is successful would seem redundant. Given the termination of conflict, despite the considerable difficulties posed by the complex nature of war outlined above, the case for "The ECOMOG Miracle" might appear to be self-evident: skeptics who characterize the operation as "unwarranted aggression" might seem to have missed the point. However, ECOMOG provides a poor peacekeeping role model. In terms of intent, method and outcomes, the ECOMOG operation embodied serious flaws that make it an imperfect model for building future African intervention capabilities. Even at its inception, ECOMOG was controversial, not least because the justifications given for intervention were questionable. ECOWAS maintained that intervention was a duty as prescribed by the 1981 ECOWAS Defense Protocol. According to Article 16, the head of State of a member under attack may request action or assistance from the Community. Article 4 of the Protocol empowers ECOWAS to initiate collective intervention in any internal armed conflict within any state, engineered and supported actively from outside, and likely to endanger the security and peace of the entire community. Articles 6(3) and 17 empower the Authority to decide on the expediency of military action, to impose a peacekeeping force between the warring factions, or to engage in political mediation. Also, Article 13(1,2) provides for creation of Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC) from earmarked units. The problem was that although Doe requested aid, it was not from Nigeria or ECOWAS. Nigeria then took the issue to ECOWAS for consideration. While attempts were made to justify the intervention in terms of the existence of a crisis that would "endanger the security and peace of the entire community", ultimately there does not exist (and probably never will) any objective criteria to decide when a problem might or might not fit into this category. Given this, the issue was one of political interpretation; in the case of Liberia, this interpretation did not command consensus and provoked resistance from Francophone states such as Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea who were themselves sympathetic toward or actively supporting the NPFL.

As justifications for intervention, democracy and human rights proved to be equally problematic; humanitarian considerations provide no legal reason for intervention (Ero 1995), nor could one ignore the irony of states such as Nigeria in 1990 tasking ECOMOG with "creating the necessary conditions for free and fair elections." Nor could the intervention draw on international legitimacy since the UN did not authorize ECOMOG from the outset: the first UN political response was not until October 1992 when it retrospectively approved ECOMOG`s actions under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

It might be thought that a regional operation would provide a much better chance of avoiding common peacekeeping problems, if only by virtue of a greater interest in and understanding local conditions. In dealing with a complex dispute, however, the ECOMOG force encountered many of the same problems as UN operations. Indeed, in key areas, such as strategic direction, the formulation of mandates, the use of force, cooperation with other organizations, and the question of resources, the operation proved to be less effective than other international deployments. Divisions at the strategic political level had a significant impact on operations. Although a multi-national operation is theoretically a method of reducing tensions by preventing unilateral advantage, it can, in practice, simply act as a catalyst for conflict. This was indeed the case with ECOWAS, which was the mandating body for ECOMOG and which was supposed to exercise political control over it. ECOWAS was divided by conflicting ideas over how the ECOMOG force should operate, a situation attributable to the diverging geostrategic interests of its member states and to emerging problems over contributions to the operation. The clearest problem resulted from the clash between the interests of Nigeria and those of other West African states, notably Côte d`Ivoire (George 1994), which provided the bulk of the ECOMOG troops and financial contributions opposed Charles Taylor`s NPFL. It provided Samuel Doe with assistance; despite denials by then President Ibrahim Babangida, the Nigerians supplied weapons and ammunition to Monrovia during the AFL campaign in Nimba county (Clement 1995). Once Doe had been killed, Nigeria continued to provide support for factions opposed to the NPFL, including the AFL, ULIMO, and the Liberian Peace Council (LPC). Nigeria`s opposition to Taylor was founded on a number of pillars. While Doe was a good friend of Nigeria`s President, Taylor`s actions, including the killings of up to 1,000 Nigerian nationals in Monrovia in 1990, and his close links with Nigeria's regional rival Côte d`Ivoire, seemed to threaten Nigerian interests in the region (Clement 1995). Fear of a "ripple of instability" that might be generated by the Liberian war and concerns that once Taylor was in power, Liberia might become a refuge and source of aid for opponents of Nigeria`s military regime. These factors were also contributory factors.

According to Babangida: "In a sub-region of 16 countries where one out of three West Africans is a Nigerian, it is imperative that any regime in this country should relentlessly strive toward the prevention or avoidance of the deterioration of any crisis which threatens to jeopardize or compromise the stability, prosperity, and security of the sub-region. We believe that if a crisis is of such level that has the potential to threaten the stability, peace and security of the sub-region, Nigeria, in collaboration with others in this sub-region, is duty-bound to react or respond in appropriate manner necessary to ensure peace, tranquility and harmony". Nigeria's policy toward ECOMOG, its methods and objectives, was therefore colored by its fundamental antipathy toward Taylor`s NPFL. Taylor, on the other hand, received support from Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso as well as from further abroad, e.g., France and Libya. The maneuverings of the rival Anglophone group, dominated by Nigeria, and the Francophone`s, dominated by Cote d`Ivoire, had profound implications for the ECOMOG operation. They're existed considerable resentment of Nigeria`s rather heavy-handed use of its influence: for example, there was a dispute with Ghana and Benin regarding Nigeria`s unilateral replacement of ECOMOG Force Commander Arnold Quainoo (a Ghanaian) with Nigerian Joshua Dogonyaro. One member of the SMC stated that "ECOMOG is nothing but a convenient camouflage for an effective Nigerian war machine."(Ofuatey 1994). Moreover, as

Nigerian influence within the operation grew, it became increasingly difficult to isolate ECOMOG from Nigerian domestic politics. Thus, Dogonyaro's eventual removal as commander was attributed to Babangida's fears about the former's successes and the possible emergence of a future rival. Economic and political costs of those involved also contributed to division. As the operation became progressively more dangerous, costly and protracted, the willingness of ECOWAS states to support potentially dangerous options often correspondingly decreased. The Senegalese contingent, for example, was withdrawn after initial casualties caused the Government to forbid its contingent from engaging in combat operations without significant Nigerian support. Divisions at the strategic political level eroded the decision-making capability of ECOWAS and led to an inability to decide which objectives to pursue at any given time. The effect of ECOMOG was to commit it to a composite "operation of the lowest common denominator", in which political priorities often triumphed over military practicalities. Moreover, in time honored fashion, national governments intervened directly in ECOMOG operations by giving instructions to their own contingent, undermining the cohesion of the force and sometimes creating potentially disastrous situations (Howe 1997).

Another related difficulty was the lack of clarity in the mandates given to ECOMOG. Initially, the ECOMOG Force Commander was tasked with the "conduct of military operations for the purpose of monitoring the cease-fire" and "restoring law and order to create the necessary conditions for free and fair elections to be held in Liberia". However, as the situation evolved, the operation became tasked with various functions in which the mandates were often very vague, particularly concerning situations in which force would be used. For example, within a month of deployment, the Force Commander, Arnold Quainoo, found himself subject to a major NPFL offensive. Far from "monitoring" a cease-fire "The military situation "is such that my forces now have no choice but to mount a limited offensive in order to protect their positions and enforce a cease-fire". Yet, the Nigerian president stated soon after that "ECOMOG is a peace force. Our mission there is clear, precise, and attainable. ECOMOG forces are soldiers without enemies or favored factions in the conflict; they can open fire only in self-defense." Agreements at Bamako (November 1990) and Lomé (February 1991) tasked ECOMOG with "monitoring" cease-fires, drawing up buffer zones, establishing checkpoints, and disarming militias without any clear guidelines about how this would be achieved in a non-permissive environment. At Lomé, for example, the ECOMOG cease-fire was to be "supervised and maintained" by ECOMOG through the take-over of airports and ports, the establishment of roadblocks at strategic locations, patrols into the countryside, escorts/transports to repatriate displaced persons, and so forth. The manner in which they were to be maintained, given the paucity in the numbers of troops, and what would happen if ECOMOG were resisted were not stated.

Another example of the confusion surrounding mandates was the later decision relating to implementation of the Yamoussoukro IV agreement: ECOMOG was tasked on the one hand with using "all necessary measures" to ensure compliance with sanctions (ECOWAS Article 6. 227), while on the other an explicit assumption of the forces status as peacekeepers continued to be made (ECOWAS Article 10. 230). The mandates were thus often only tenuously linked to the reality of ECOMOG's material and political circumstances and provided little guidance on how the use of force could be linked to the attainment of the operation's wider strategic objectives. Closely linked to the difficulties caused by strategic-level political differences and the issue of mandates were the problems associated with ECOMOG's military strategy, which oscillated between peacekeeping and peace enforcement without decisive breakthroughs in either.

The problem with ECOMOG was that effective peace enforcement was difficult. One effect of increasing the risk and intensity of operations was that it further eroded consensus within ECOWAS because of the progress of the Command Structure and the way in which ECOWAS operations were directed specifically against the NPFL. The friction generated by this contributed to a lack of strategic direction regarding where the force should be applied

and the outcomes that ECOMOG wanted to achieve. This problem was exacerbated by several other factors. One was the NPFL`s move toward a guerrilla strategy, which meant that, despite holding Monrovia and extending the area controlled by the IGNU, ECOMOG found it difficult to exploit their success. Another was that, despite being a West African force, ECOMOG displayed a remarkable ignorance of the geography, people and politics of Liberia even to the extent that the initial planning for the operation was carried out on the basis of a tourist map (Howe R. 1997). Often lacking an understanding of the context in which it operated, it is not so surprising that ECOMOG found that its military strategy did not always produce the desired results. Moreover, ironically, the early territorial gains made through peace enforcement tended to encourage the view within ECOMOG that a military solution could be found, which served to undermine attempts to find a political solution, particularly early on (Africa confidential 1993).

Moving to peace enforcement, of course, also undermined the already partial consent for ECOMOG deployment. The loss of consent in itself may not have been a critical weakness if ECOMOG had retained its impartiality, but this was further compromised through its attempts at peace enforcement. Nigeria's determination to get rid of Charles Taylor reinforced the perception that ECOMOG was not neutral (Ofuatey 1994). Even before ECOMOG was deployed, Taylor had announced his intention to resist the operation, making Babangida`s comment that ECOMOG was "going to Liberia not to fight but to keep the peace" rather optimistic. The NPFL's concerns about ECOMOG were also extended to IGNU, which had little ability to secure itself and, as a result, was seen by the NPFL as a government imposed by Nigeria through ECOWAS. Finding it difficult to score a decisive victory against the NPFL, ECOMOG tried to exploit the civil war situation by allying itself with some of the warring factions; for example, the AFL, ULIMO, and forces controlled by IGNU cooperated with ECOMOG in the attacks on Taylor's HQ at Gbarnga in 1993 (Africa Confidential 1996). During the outbreak of violence in April 1996, ECOMOG forces were alleged to have helped clear a way for the forces of Kromah and Taylor in their assaults on Prince Johnson's positions in Monrovia (Thomas 1995). The issue of impartiality was significant since, after the signing of the Cotonou Agreement in 1993, ECOMOG attempted to shift into a new peacemaking phase in cooperation with the UN and the OAU. The problem was, however, that the disarmament and cantonment of the factions would always be difficult if the NPFL and its allies had no confidence in the willingness of ECOMOG to treat all factions equally. Even without the preceding difficulties, ECOMOG's task would have been a challenge because of a lack of resources. Financial and material constraints left ECOMOG consistently short of the means necessary to either inflict a "defeat" decisive enough to deliver lasting political gains or implement ambitious peacemaking programs. This in part explains the initial force of only 3000, which was inadequate for anything except holding. Indeed, without heavy investment from Nigeria, the operation could never have been mounted, a fact that made it easier for it to adopt a leadership role (Ofuatey 1994). Estimates made at the time indicated that the complete occupation of Liberia would have required Nigeria to increase its ECOMOG forces to 15,000 at a cost of $135 million. Although, as one ECOMOG commander pointed out, the sum was "what NATO spends in a few days in Bosnia", it represented a prohibitive expense for ECOWAS.

The lack of troops was one explanation for the inability of the force to seal off the border and cut the NPFL's access to finance and material and also the failure to prevent the war from spreading into Sierra Leone in March 1991. Even when the numbers were sufficient, there were critical equipment shortfalls, not least about communication equipment and transport, particularly helicopters (Howe H. 168). The lack of resources also had important implications for the effectiveness and morale of the troops; according to Jean-Daniel Tauxe of the ICRC, ECOMOG forces were variously unpaid or underpaid, and in such conditions are peacekeepers in name only" (Jean D 1996). This created friction with UNOMIL personnel whose operations were much better funded but who depended upon ECOMG to function (Funmi 1996). It also led to numerous alleged incidents of

corruption, including the sale of fuel purchased by the US intended for ECOMOG vehicles; hence, the local joke that ECOMOG was an acronym for "Every Car or Moving Object Gone" (Newsweek 1996). The issue of low and irregular pay was worsened by the lack of an organized system to relieve troops deployed in Liberia. One UN officer commented "They're not motivated, not rotated, often not paid" (Newsweek 1996)

The poverty of the ECOMOG contributors highlighted the significance of external sources of aid; this was, however, a double-edged sword. The degree of dependency on outside sources provided leverage to aid donors and led to considerable discontent in ECOMOG, which was unlikely to foster faith in their mission. The US, as the largest contributor to the UN Trust Fund for Liberia, held what amounted to a veto over expenditure, even to the extent of canceling some fuel purchases. The US also expressed regret through its late provision of promised logistics, transport and communication equipment for ECOMOG forces. One area in which ECOMOG might have scored highly was its relationship with the UN. The UN established the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) in 1994 following an agreement reached by the protagonists at Cotonou in the previous year, and UNOMIL and ECOMOG worked together to implement the peace accord. This was the first such arrangement, and its potential utility as a method for resolving other disputes makes it a relationship worth examining (Africa Confidential 1996).

The relationship between UNOMIL and ECOMOG was often less than harmonious. The difficulties were partly practical, such as who should be in charge of joint operations, and partly psychological, not least a certain degree of resentment of the UN on the part of ECOMOG and thus an unwillingness to relinquish control. There were tensions at the higher level between the respective force commanders, the central issue being which should be the lead force ECOMOG was already deployed and was the larger formation UNOMIL, on the other hand, was entrusted under Cotonou with "supervising" implementation, which implied some kind of directing role. Additional friction was caused by perceived UN high-handedness and an alleged lack of appreciation of the realities on the ground, including a failure to keep ECOMOG properly briefed and naiveté in their dealings with the NPFL. In part, these problems could be attributed to the late involvement of the UN; the lack of effective political direction exercised by ECOWAS in the period before UNOMIL involvement led ECOMOG to become, in some sense, self-tasking, taking control of both the political and military aspects of operations. This made it more difficult for the UN to accept cooperation with UN agencies (United Nation report 1995). Some ECOMOG soldiers also viewed the whole idea of being "monitored" by the UN as at best irrelevant and at worst an act which undermined them; according to the Gambian contingent commander in July 1994 "...it is like an inconvenience. Monitoring ECOMOG signals distrust." These problems were worsened by the UN`s own attempts to improve its local profile; the "trust the UN" public information campaign in Liberia was seen by some ECOMOG members as an implied criticism of the West African force`s credibility with the population. Therefore, it is not surprising to find a certain tension in the UNOMIL/ECOMOG relationship at a lower level.

2.3.5   Peace Restoration

Despite these challenges and criticisms, ECOMOG successfully executed its challenging missions. In Liberia, ECOMOG successfully supervised the implementation of the final cease-fire and assisted legislative and presidential elections. In other words, ECOMOG fostered respect for democratic rules in the country. In addition, they protected and saved Liberian lives by stopping fighting in the country. In Sierra-Leone, it succeeded in reinstalling an elected government that had been overthrown by rebels. In Guinea-Bissau, where ECOMOG did not complete its mission, it prevented manslaughter after the coup. Right after the coup, officials and the loyalists of the overthrown government surrendered to ECOMOG, which protected them for some days before handing them over to the new officials in front of religious leaders and diplomats who served as witnesses. It was also noticed that after the withdrawal of ECOMOG from the countries, the trouble started again, as Liberian President

Taylor said, "From 1999 to this date, this country has been at war" Another example is the fact that ECOMOG was asked again to intervene in Sierra-Leone when the RUF started taking the UN peacekeeping personnel hostages.

In addition to these facts, ECOMOG will become the permanent military force of ECOWAS. It is also composed of several stand-by units in their countries of origin, ready for immediate deployment. These stand-by units are trained, equipped, and organized by the Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defense, and Security. The regional centers for training are located on the Ivory Coast and Ghana. Taking all this into consideration, the successes of ECOMOG, despite all its problems and criticisms from Taylor's supporters, prove that ECOMOG is a necessary institution to help bring about peace in West Africa.

During the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia, the main problem it faced was the proliferation of fighting factions. During the first five years of ECOMOG's intervention, ECOWAS sponsored a series of peace agreements, all of which ultimately failed due to ECOMOG's inability to deal impartially with different factions in the conflict. As political standoffs and military stalemates continued to block efforts to resolve the conflict, new warring movements emerged, driven by looting and illegal exploitation of natural resources. The mission became overloaded with the responsibility of securing a fragmented country under the control of many warlords. ECOMOG did not achieve its original goal of defeating the main faction, nor did it succeed in convincing the parties to the conflict to adhere to a peace pact. ECOMOG's failure to attain peace in Liberia prompted the joining of the United Nations after the Cotonou Peace Agreement of July 1993, sponsored by ECOWAS. The Security Council, through Resolution 866, established the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). The collaborative effort was established to assist in supervising and monitoring the implementation of the signed peace plans and to restore ECOMOG's neutrality and legitimacy.

The United Nations was invited to join the search for peace effort in Liberia only after ECOWAS had failed to make any appreciable progress toward conflict resolution. ECOWAS' peacekeeping actions, as is usually the case when disputes are over power and resources. With the continued frustration in attaining peace in Liberia, ECOMOG changed tactics by allowing the warlords to serve on the Council of State without being disqualified from contesting elections. At the regional level, the change of tact was linked to the domestic political situation in some contributing countries to ECOMOG. "Some of the participant countries, including Ghana and Nigeria, began to show some political fatigue with regard to continuing the intervention and finding a mediated solution. " Following the Abuja peace agreement sponsored by the UN and ECOWAS, signed on August 19, 1995, a cease-fire was reached between the different factions. The peace accord marked the beginning of the resolution of the Liberian civil war. Accordingly, ECOMOG and UNOMIL were deployed throughout the country to monitor the cease-fire and disarm the combatants.

The provision of the Abuja agreement broadened the responsibilities of ECOMOG, particularly in calling for it to disarm and demobilize fighters throughout the Liberian territory. The implementation of this agreement requires more peacekeepers on the ground. As the political situation in Liberia evolved, the UN became more involved in the conflict. Alongside the ECOMOG forces, 300 UN peacekeepers were deployed to supervise the cease-fire and peace process until the execution of legislative and presidential elections. After this agreement, ECOMOG succeeded to a great extent in disarming and demobilizing fighters by collecting massive quantities of weapons.

2.3.6   Gap in Literature

There have been many works on ECOWAS, ECOMOG, and the Liberian civil war, but none of these has really fully focused on why ECOWAS, which was set up for economic integration in Africa, would involve itself in the political affairs of its member state, as this work did.

2.4   Theoretical Framework

2.4.1   Rational Actor

Supporting the view of one of the modern exponents of political realism, Hans J. Morgenthau, Decision-Making theory posits that an element of rationalism infuses the decision – making process of government; that the hand of prudence guides the statesman to choose from a menu of alternatives an option with a high premium. The rational decision-maker rejects options on the basis of costs and benefits calculations and settles for an option that is low in cost but high in utility value, defined as the national interest (Allison, 1969 and 1971, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf, 1971, Kissinger, 1957 and Scheling, 1962); Morgenthau, 1967; Steinbruner, 1982. Scholars who assert that the interest of the statesman is co-terminus with the interest of the state he represents. Hegel (cited in Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf, 1971: 315), writes; "It is one of our basic methodological choices to define the state as its official decision makers, whose authoritarian acts are to all intents and purposes the acts of the state. State action is an action taken by those acting in the name of the state" The statesmen is deemed a rational actor in the sense that in any given problem that confronts his/her national society, he/she ascertains what the facts are and their implications for national security and survival. The choices or actions taken are the rational acts necessary to ensure the interests, security, protection and survival of the state. Morgenthau states that "... all nations are compelled to protect their physical, political and cultural identity against encroachment by other nations." (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf, 1971: 76).

Realists believe that unlike the state level where there is a centralized authority which imposes order and control through its laws and effective sanction mechanisms. In cases of violations at the international level, no overarching authority can impose orders. This is partly because each state is a sovereign entity that is not subject to any external law. As a result, anarchy prevails on the international plane. Therefore, in the quest for survival, an option available to the state is the acquisition of power. Power is sought by states both as a means and an end. It takes power, which, at one level, may be defined as military might to combat any threat to the security and survival of the state. Therefore, states will use force to further their national interests. Again, in this world of anarchy, the acquisition of power becomes a guarantee against external aggression.

Morgenthau (1967) argued that this element of rationalism in the decisions of statesmen is what lends continuity and similarity to nations' foreign policies. Thus, regardless of who is in charge of the affairs of the state, choices are guided by rational calculations defined in terms of national interests. In pursuit of the national interest, it is argued that the state or the statesman is guided by morality that is different from that of the individual. In essence, the adage: "The end justifies the means" is applicable here. The morality of decisions or acts of the state is determined by its national interest. This would lead Morgenthau to instruct that the act of statesmen or political acts" must be judged by rational criteria.

2.4.2   The Game Theory.

Besides the classic concept of a unitary decision-maker who decides in the interest of the state and in any deliberation of policy decision, there are multiplicity of actors, who form coalitions and counter-coalitions and represent different interests and constituencies (Allison, 1969 and 1971, Riker, 1962; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf, 1971), Truman, 1951. Therefore, in any given issue, diverse interests may exist that produce group conflicts. It asserts that the decisional unit comprises actors representing various departments and "constituencies" such as defense, foreign affairs, and treasury. This category includes secretaries and advisors or cabinet members. Political parties and pressure or civil groups may influence the policy formulation process. In every policy deliberation process, the players have different policy preferences. The players possess varied degrees of bargaining skills, knowledge, and power potential, which they enlist in their bid to secure the adoption of their preference. What emerges after much "pulling and hauling" as the policy choice is based on compromise (Allison,

1969, Destler, 1972: 14 - 20). (Spanier 1987: 544) puts it thus: "... what emerges as the policy choice is the outcome of the political process, the government actions resulting from all the arguments, the building of coalitions and counter- coalitions and the decision by high officials and compromise among them" The adage: "where you sit indicates where you stand" assumes much prominence in such a decisional process. For instance, in any policy deliberations that touch on security. Among other things, if the military industrial complex is not a myth, a military action would enable the military establishment to give contracts to its clients and manufacturers of military hardware. The nature of security has become one of the most widely discussed elements in the intellectual ferment triggered by the end of the Cold War. Optimists have declared that the end of the century is ushering in a new era of peace and cooperation, based on liberal democracy, transnational capitalism, international organizations, or a combination of the above. Realism, idealism, constructivism, and pluralism have challenged this dominant conceptualization in numerous ways. This section examines the theoretical challenges of these security research approaches (Spanier 1987: 546). The theoretical analysis of this security situation is critical because much of the academic debate on the economic causes of contemporary armed conflict has become polarized around the greed versus grievance dichotomy, juxtaposing "loot-seeking" with "justice-seeking" rebellion, and, more generally, the significance of economic as opposed to socio-political drivers of civil war. In most cases, policy perspectives have been significantly shaped by the controversial "greed theory", which posits that rebels pursue economic resources not simply to sustain war, but rather that war is pursued to obtain resources. The so-called "resource wars" in Angola, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which were fueled by diamonds and other valuable resources, are often-cited examples.

The political economy of civil wars or intrastate conflicts presents greed rather than grievance as the driving force of many conflicts in Africa. They linked the availability of lootable resources as a major trigger for military intervention in intrastate conflicts. Conflict is driven more by rationally calculated action rather than by irrational grievance, particularly in identifying state-level factors, such as the availability of natural resources. While supply-side measures of regulations have been identified as necessary, they were seen as inadequate as long as structural issues that drive demand-side factors of state weaknesses and underdevelopment have not been addressed. Any intervention efforts by the international community will continue to treat symptoms rather than the actual root causes of armed conflict in most developing countries, more especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Many alternative explanations have been used to explain these conflicts.

2.5.2   Conclusion

The establishment of ECOMOG by ECOWAS provides a practical expression for the cooperation expected by the UN. The ECOMOG interventions were fully endorsed, not just by an international community (represented by the UN) and by Africans who wanted to break the country's dependence on outside military assistance in response to African conflicts. In the aftermath of the Cold War interference by the major Western powers in African conflicts, the desire of Africans not only to maintain their peace but also to define their security apparatus is a welcome development.

This chapter reviewed literature in three broad areas: the Liberian civil war, ECOWAS, and security issues in West Africa, ECOWAS operations, and their many challenges. It is important to conclude with a more optimistic note, highlighting the successes of ECOMOG. Leaving aside questions about the effectiveness of the intervention and the peace and stability that ECOMOG tried to achieve, it did shed light on the potential for Africa to develop effective and reliable African-owned security mechanisms for managing conflicts. As security in the 21st century will largely be an African responsibility, the advent of sub-regional conflict management in various parts of Africa should not be overlooked. ECOMOG has opened the doors for Africans to determine the future of their security; the task is for the rest of Africa to build upon its various trials and tribulations. However, it cannot be overstated

that a degree of caution is needed by all those who want to promote ECOMOG as an effective peacekeeping and peace enforcement model for Africa. Throughout its nine years of operating in difficult circumstances in Liberia, the simple fact cannot be overlooked that ECOMOG fell victim to the geopolitical machinations of Nigeria, a powerful regional hegemon. Now that this hegemony has embarked on the road to democratization, seasoned observers of ECOMOG can only hope that it uses ECOMOG as a 'force for good', not only in managing West African security dilemmas but in informing other sub-regional organizations as they attempt to respond to conflicts.

CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1   Introduction

This chapter explains in detail the methodology employed in addressing the research questions and provides a rationale for selecting the methodological approach. The methodology is the way in which a researcher conducts his or her study by providing answers to questions that aim at approving or disapproving a research hypothesis. This chapter explains the aspects of research design, study population and sampling technique, research instrument, data collection, validity, and reliability of instruments and data analysis. Taking cognizance of the nature of this study and the questions being investigated, a qualitative research form of information was generated through three (3) qualitative research techniques: in-depth interviews, case study, and personal observation in the field. These qualitative data sources were augmented with information from secondary sources, which included ideas from literature on the Liberian Civil War, peace enforcement, and ECOMOG.

3.2   Research Design

This study employed a qualitative research methodology and adopted historical/documentary research. In-depth oral interviews were used to gather primary/empirical data. In addition, both published and unpublished materials were used. Such publications deal with ECOWAS activities related to ECOMOG deployment.

3.3   Data Collection

This research on the ECOWAS peace enforcement role in Liberia uses only within-method triangulation to gauge participants' perceptions of ECOWAS activities in Liberia. By adopting this method, questions were asked through in-depth interviews using semi-structured interview techniques. These data collection instruments were supplemented by personal observation and documentary evidence.

3.4   Study Population and sampling technique

The population of this study includes (8) people, four (4) civilians, and four (4) military personnel who were involved in peace enforcement operations, particularly those that were directly and indirectly involved in ECOMOG activities in Liberia. The chapter also includes scholars in the field of conflict resolution, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement operations who have written extensively on the subject of inquiry. These people are knowledgeable in the field of peace enforcement operations. Overall, eight people were interviewed, including former military ECOWAS peace enforcers in Liberia and three civilians involved in ECOMOG activities in Liberia. Seven interviews were conducted.

3.5   Research Instrument

There are many sources or instruments of data collection, but in my study, which is purely analytical, two instruments for data collection, primary data (in-depth oral interview) and secondary data (literature) were used.

   A.   Primary source: These are data collected from individuals directly involved. These comprised the data collected from the followings;

1.   Interviews: The researcher designed semi-structured interview questions for people who are directly or indirectly involved in ECOMOG in Liberia. The researcher conducted the interview.

2.   Secondary source: The secondary sources of the information were from the literature review. This means using Articles and Journals from various experts in the field of peace enforcement. The samples were collected from the following places:

 i.   ECOWAS parliament in Abuja
ii.   Liberian Embassy in Abuja
iii.   Online Publications

3.6   Validity of the Instrument

Content Validity refers to whether a measurement captures the content or the meaning of the variables being measured. The interview questions were developed by the researcher and the researcher's supervisor, an expert in peace operations. The researcher subjected the research instrument to scrutiny by the supervisor and was also cross-examined and modified by another expert in the field of peace enforcement operations. A pilot study of the research instrument was undertaken by the researcher.

3.7   Data Analysis

Data analysis entails the examination of primary and secondary data collected using within-methods triangulation techniques. The primary and secondary data for this study were analyzed using content and discussion analyses.

CHAPTER FOUR
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.1   Introduction

This chapter analyzes the primary data gathered through an in-depth Oral interview and personal observation in the field. The chapter also discusses primary data and information from secondary sources, which includes ideas from the literature vis-à-vis research questions and study objectives. The qualitative research methodology was adopted in analyzing the empirical/primary data, which were derived from an interview conducted with some ECOWAS officials in Nigeria and military officers, as well as some civilian personnel that participated in ECOWAS peace enforcement operations in Liberia. A review of the literature has revealed differing views among scholars regarding the effectiveness of ECOWAS intervention in the Liberian civil war. In order to have a broader perspective on this study's research questions, we need to transcend the literature and engage in an empirical study through field-based research. Therefore, I interviewed some retired and serving soldiers and civilians who participated in the ECOWAS peace enforcement mission in Liberia. I contend that listening to the voices of stakeholders in the ECOWAS mission in Liberia illuminates the researchers' understanding of the participant's perceptions of the subject of study.

4.2   Description of the Respondents

In carrying out this study, eight people were interviewed. Four (4) interviewees were military personnel and four (4) of them were civilians. These people were involved in ECOWAS peace enforcement in Liberia. These people were security experts, peace-keeping/peace operation decision-makers, and practitioners. Table 4.1 provides the distribution of respondents.

Table 4. 1: Description of Respondents (**SOURCE:** Author's field work, 2019)

S/N	RESPONDENTS	POSITION	LOCATION	DATE OF INTERVIEW
1	Nigerian Army officer (A)	Major General (Retired)	Abuja, Nigeria	11-04-2019
2	Former Nigerian peacekeeper in Liberia (D)	Major (Retired)	Abuja, Nigeria	22-14-2019
3	Nigerian Army officer (B)	Colonel	Abuja, Nigeria	8-05-2019
4	Former Nigerian peacekeeper in Liberia (F)	Peace Operation Practitioners	Liberian Embassy, Abuja, Nigeria	14-05-2019
5	Civilian (H)	Security Expert	Abuja, Nigeria	16-05-2019
6	Civilian (G)	Security Expert	Abuja, Nigeria	20-05-2019
7	Civilian (D)	Security Expert	ECOWAS Parliament, Abuja	22-05-2019
8	Civilian (C)	Security Expert	ECOWAS Annex, Abuja, Nigeria	25-05-2019

4.3   Results

The objectives of this study were achieved through in-depth oral interviews and documents. Substantial information was provided by the respondents regarding the questions asked.

4.3.1 Evaluation of ECOMOG's interventions in the Liberian civil war.

The objectives of this study were achieved through in-depth interviews, online publications, and other reliable sources. Substantial information was provided by the respondents regarding the questions asked.

In August of 1990, concerned by the war's devastating effect on Liberia's civilian population and the lack of international engagement, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) dispatched peacekeeping forces through the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to quell the violence. This position is well supported by the eight people who were interviewed (Interviews, No 1)

When I asked my respondents whether ECOMOG prevented the re-emergence of conflict in Liberia,

The eight interviewees thought that ECOMOG alone could not prevent the re-emergence of conflict in Liberia. The combination of other peace operation activities will require the achievement of sustainable peace. This position was supported by such scholars as (Lima. 2002) and (Shilue, 2014).

Respondent D stated:

The ECOMOG operation may not have prevented the re-emergence of conflict in Liberia, because it was not ready at the time of deployment. ECOMOG's efforts largely failed. It entered a contested situation with inadequate resources. It did not enjoy wide political support; it lacked detailed knowledge of Liberia and the conflict; its military capabilities and mandate were ineffective; and its commitment to remain had some destabilizing effects, notably the aiding of surrogate forces. Furthermore, ECOMOG's participation appeared to have prolonged the conflict… (Interview, No 4).

Respondent E in Abuja, Nigeria, stated the following:

While recognizing the shortcomings of ECOMOG, note that ECOWAS took this initiative to respond to a devastating war that showed signs of spilling over into neighboring countries and eventually did so in the case of Sierra Leone. ECOWAS had envisioned that ECOMOG would be a short, surgical police action; however, by the time ECOMOG arrived, Taylor forces had controlled 90% of Liberia's territory, and there was no ceasefire for it to monitor. He said ECOMOG's offensive in Liberia succeeded in containing the conflict, at least for a short period, preventing the situation from degenerating into genocidal proportions like the type of all-out slaughter witnessed between April and July 1994 in Rwanda. (Interview No 5)

According to Babangida: "In a sub-region of 16 countries where one out of three West Africans is a Nigerian, it is imperative that any regime in this country should relentlessly strive toward the prevention or avoidance of the deterioration of any crisis which threatens to jeopardize or compromise the stability, prosperity, and security of the sub-region. We believe that if a crisis is of such level that has the potential to threaten the stability, peace and security of the sub-region, Nigeria, in collaboration with others in this sub-region, is duty-bound to react or respond in appropriate manner necessary to ensure peace, tranquility and harmony" (Ibrahim B 1990). This situation reaffirms respondent A's position:

On the humanitarian front, Although ECOMOG never had explicit humanitarian objectives, it did reduce hostilities and atrocities, and by establishing order in greater Monrovia, it set up a safe haven for thousands of displaced Liberians. By securing the ports and airports, he also assisted relief operations. In this phase, ECOMOG functioned as a police force within its security zone and a defense force against the NPFL… (Interview, No 1)

Respondent C, who participated in the Liberia peace operation, stated:

Ending the fighting and achieving peace proved an immensely complicated task due to the emergence of multiple armed actors constantly changing sides and, in many cases, supported by other countries in the region, each with its own agenda… (Interview, No 3).

Respondent B stated:

…After heavy fighting in Monrovia and with the intervention of ECOMOG, the Abuja Agreement of August 1995 was signed in which the contending parties agreed to hold democratic elections in Liberia in July 1997… (Interview, No 2)

4.3.2 Evaluation of the Extent of Implementing the ECOMOG Peace Enforcement Operation to achieve Positive Peace in Liberia

Evaluate the extent to which the ECOMOG peace enforcement operation has achieved positive peace.

This research objective was achieved using documents and the various in-depth interviews that were conducted. Based on the information gleaned from the literature and some empirical data gathered in the course of primary research for this study, it is apparent that the ECOMOG efforts in Liberia need a holistic approach in their implementation to achieve the desired result.

The mandate of ECOMOG was not clear, but it stated the following actions:

1. Agreement on a ceasefire between different factions
2. To help Liberia establish an interim government until elections can be held
3. Stop killing innocent civilians and ensure the safe evacuation of foreign nationals
4. Sought to prevent the spread of the conflict to neighboring states

Respondent C stated:

Despite the difficulties and criticisms that ECOMOG faced, it successfully executed it's challenging missions. At the time, it successfully supervised the implementation of the ceasefire resolution and assisted legislative and presidential elections. ECOMOG fostered respect for democratic rules in the country. It protected and saved Liberian lives by stopping the fight in the country… (Interview No 3).

The above position was also supported by the other respondents who were interviewed.

Respondent E stated:

Ultimately, ECOMOG's success was less in peacekeeping, since the fighting may have been more prolonged and heavier than if it had not intervened. The ECOMOG operation was, in reality, an ambiguous exercise in attrition, sustained by Nigeria's willingness to accept heavy material costs, which succeeded largely because of eventual compromises made bilaterally between the then Nigerian President, Sani Abacha, and Charles Taylor, which gave Taylor much of what he sought. Prolongation of the war was the key reason for its eventual termination, but this prolongation was made possible by the fact that the Liberian crisis was viewed by Nigeria as an issue of national interest. It did not stem from a new approach to conflict resolution… (Interview No 5)

All respondents affirmed the need for ECOMOG operations in Liberia to achieve sustainable peace. The process was helpful because of the ceasefire, which calmed the situation in the country.

To gain in-depth knowledge of the Liberian Civil war, I also asked the following question: what were the causes of the Liberian civil war?

This question was addressed using documents and in-depth interviews.

Respondent A stated:

In 1970, the unquestionable power structure began to show signs of collapse as a new constituency of disaffected, often foreign educated Liberians joined forces in various opposition groups and began voicing their demands for reform. The Liberians' dissatisfaction culminated with the "rice riots of 1979," a 2000 strong protester group, sparked off by a 50% increase in the local staple. This riot/protest turned into chaos when police began to fire at the crowd, killing more than 100 protesters. It was this growing discontent that paved the way for the military coup d'état in 1980 that brought Samuel Doe, a Krahn to power…. (Interview, No 1).

Respondent F, a Nigerian military officer who was interviewed in Abuja, Nigeria, corroborates the above position. According to him:

…although Doe himself later became a symbol for greed and corruption, the new president's bloody debut was initially welcomed by the majority of Liberians as an end to more than a century of America-Liberian rule… (Interview, No 6).

Respondent H stated:

The years that followed were marked by mounting unrest due to an increasingly Krahn-dominated authoritarian regime that promoted joint militarization and ethnically based politics and reigned over a sagging economy characterized by increasing inflation and growing unemployment… (Interview, No 8).

This position is well supported by respondent C in Abuja, Nigeria, who participated in the ECOWAS peace operation in Liberia. According to this respondent:

The authoritarian nature of Doe's regime and his failure to listen to and carry other members of his group that helped him to power led to the Thomas Quinwonkpa coup. Many Liberians that I met and talked to during the ECOMOG peace enforcement operation in Liberia, for which I was a member of that force, believed that the major factor that caused Liberia to a senseless war was the authoritarian nature of Doe's regime. Taylor capitalized on this opportunity to launch his rebellion against Doe. Unfortunately, Taylor himself misruled the country when he was in power… (Interview, No 3).

Respondent H stated:

The Liberian civil wars were fought in two phases, although the second war was a continuation of the first. The first phase of the war was fought between 1989 and 1997, while the second was between 1999 and 2003. These wars can be said to have occurred as a result of the long neglect of indigenous Liberians by America-Liberia, thereby making the Indigenous Liberians feel that an opportunity to take over power would improve all their previous suffering. However, things didn't turn out as expected for indigenous Liberians because Samuel Doe came into power. This factor cannot be directly attributed to the immediate cause of the war. Other factors such as the misgovernance of President Samuel Doe, poverty, the food crisis, and so on… (Interview, No 8)

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY DISCUSSION OF KEY FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This study examined the role of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in the first Liberian civil war. This chapter summarizes this study. The study also presents research findings and recommendations and areas for further studies to ensure effective and reliable future ECOWAS operations in West Africa.

5.2 Summary

This study explored the ECOMOG peace enforcement operations that occurred in Liberia between 1990 and 1997. The civil war not only killed many civilians but also displaced thousands of people internally. The civil war also damaged the country's infrastructures and Liberia's economy contracted rather than expanded. The country

thus witnessed a long period of anarchy. At some points, the state of anarchy brought about the intervention of key stakeholders in conflict management, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), regional organizations like ECOWAS, and international organizations such as the United Nations (UN). The assessment of the role of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in the first Liberian civilian is therefore the focus of this study. This study is reported in five chapters.

Chapter 1 introduced the study and discussed background issues such as the Statement of the Problem, Research Questions, Research Objectives, Significance of the Study, Scope of the Study, Limitations of the Study, and Definition of Terms, among others.

Chapter 2 reviews key studies that are significantly related to this study. Such concepts as Conflicts, Peace, Peace Enforcement, ECOMOG, and other areas were covered in the literature review. This study also used two theories relevant to the subject of Inquiry (Rational Actor and The Game Theory)

Chapter 3 explained the study methodology (Research Methodology). This study discussed areas such as research design, study population, sampling techniques, research instruments, data collection in the field, validity of instruments, and data analysis.

Chapter 4 presents data presentation and analysis. Findings according to data analysis of primary and secondary data and by interrogating this information vis-à-vis research questions and study objectives suggest that there is much to be done for the ECOWAS to conduct successful peace operations in West Africa. The primary date was also juxtaposed with scholarly literature to identify where they support and differ from one another.

Chapter 5 summarizes this study.

5.3   Key Findings

In the preceding chapters, this study examined issues from the perspectives of relevant literature in the fields of conflict management and peace operations of both the ECOWAS and the UN. This was achieved by comparing and contrasting the primary data collected during fieldwork with the information gleaned from the literature on ECOWAS peace operations. This exercise is carried out in order to uncover:

1.   The reasons for the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia and

2.   Whether the ECOMOG intervention has prevented the re-emergence of conflict in Liberia.

This research has revealed Nigeria's willingness and capability to lead in the affairs of the sub-region. This conception of leadership as embedded in the Nigerian foreign policy shows a desire to see the West African sub-region free of political instability and to ensure an atmosphere conducive for development. Nigeria was consistent in her participation in the quest to resolve the Liberian conflict. This statement is not meant to downplay the role played by other West African and extra-African states. However, it is undisputable that Nigeria made more sacrifices in terms of funding, troop contributions, commitment, and resolution. It was reported by Howe and Urell (1998) that the war in Liberia cost Nigeria four billion dollars and resulted in the loss of 400 Nigerian soldiers. The unparalleled commitment of Nigeria in Liberia, the unilateral decisions it took during its affairs earned the country the tag that Babangida had a "hidden agenda." For example, the first ECOMOG Force Commander, General Arnold Quainoo, a Ghanaian, was unilaterally removed from his position by the Nigerian government. Nigeria changed the mandate of the force from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. In addition to General Quainoo, subsequent ECOMOG Force Commanders were Nigerians (Sessay, 1999). Such unilateral measures obviously run against the unanimity needed in any decision-making environment.

In addition, the lack of regional consensus on security issues and rivalries between Franco and Anglophone countries negatively affected the role of ECOWAS and ECOMOG in their peace enforcement and peacemaking missions in Liberia.

5.4   Contributions to Knowledge

The findings of this study contribute to literature in the following ways:

1.   Increase our understanding of the role of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group in the Liberian civil war

2.   This project seeks to contribute to the literature on ECOWAS intervention in West African security.

3.   It also seeks to extend the frontier of knowledge and understanding in this field of scientific inquiry.

4.   It seeks to serve as a guide for future researchers who wish to write about ECOWAS or its operations in West Africa.

5.5   Further research

This study examined the role of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group in the Liberian civil war and ascertained whether this effort has led to durable positive peace in the country. The study also identified several challenges faced by ECOMOG in Liberia. This study recommends policy options for enhancing ECOWAS peacemaking activities. Both the empirical analysis of the field data and the published literature suggest that future research can consider some themes that emerged from the study. Therefore, the researcher suggests that future research should focus on the following areas;

The scope of this study is limited to the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia. Future research could focus on other ECOMOG activities in other regions in West Africa. Other ECOMOG activities in Sierra Leone could be compared with those in Liberia to develop broad perspectives on the effectiveness of ECOWAS activities in West Africa.

This research focused deeply on the ECOMOG operation in the first Liberian civil War (1989-1996), however, future research can examine ECOMOG operations in the second Liberian Civil war (1999- 2003).

5.6   Conclusion

In conclusion, ECOWAS was established to promote economic development in West Africa, and it is one of the sub-regional organizations in Africa. Countries in West Africa did not have the same colonizers; therefore, different languages are spoken in this part of Africa. Therefore, the fact that there are different languages spoken made unity in the region difficult. In December 1989, with the conflict in Liberia, ECOWAS set up its military force to intervene in that country; that force is known as the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).

ECOMOG is a concrete manifestation of ECOWAS states' desire to assume primary responsibility for promoting peace and security in the sub-region. Although it can be seen as an unsatisfactory model of a peace enforcement force, ECOMOG in Liberia has successfully protected the capital and saved some lives. ECOMOG also responded when the international community refused to engage in this conflict. It was created and fielded with unusual speed and effectiveness for an African organization. The weaknesses noted earlier, which include Nigeria's domination, limited military capacity, lack of financial resources, and lack of military and political structure, could be solved in the future as West African countries become more involved in ECOWAS activities. In addition to these problems, Liberian President Taylor's supporters did not agree with the idea to create ECOMOG and affirmed that "ECOWAS is an economic rather than a security organization, with no legal right to create a military group such as ECOMOG. The 1978 ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression and the OAU and UN charters all prohibit interference in the domestic affairs of member states' internal conflicts".

ECOMOG, through its military interventions in the West African conflicts, has succeeded in settling conflicts and reducing violence in the region. Despite the challenges discussed in this study, ECOMOG has undergone a significant transformation to overcome the challenges presented by security matters and regional political developments. The transition from operating in a merely ad hoc manner when coping with regional conflicts to having a more standing framework to manage those crises has often demonstrated the ability of ECOMOG to consolidate its institutions. Notwithstanding the lack of means and experience in peacebuilding, ECOMOG was

always determined to respond to regional armed conflicts and ensure regional stability. Given the prominent role of regional stability, ECOWAS aimed at ensuring a security environment suitable for economic development and social progress. Finally, after many years of political disagreement and regional rivalry over false problems, ECOMOG has demonstrated its ability to achieve regional consensus on security issues. From the beginning of its deployment in Liberia in 1990, ECOMOG has been engaged in ensuring security and order in the country and in searching for a peaceful resolution to civil war. During the intervention period, it participated in the protection of civilian populations to alleviate their suffering. It also joined with others in their efforts to broker numerous peace plans, urging fighting factions to comply with the provisions of peace agreements. ECOMOG convened peace talks among the fighting parties in Liberia, which, after seven years of fighting, culminated with the peaceful resolution of the protracted conflict. Following this peace agreement, ECOMOG actively contributed to monitor the cease-fire, disarmament, and demobilization of combatants. With UN cooperation, ECOMOG helped to implement a peace process, particularly the preparation and supervision of elections in Liberia.

This study outlines the evolution of ECOWAS and its expansion into the peace and security domain in the form of ECOMOG peacekeeping and peace support operations. However, if ECOMOG is to serve as a permanent regional peacekeeping and conflict management mechanism and become part of the proposed African Union African Standby Force (ASF), valuable lessons can be learned from its West African operations. For instance, the ad hoc nature of deployment did not provide sufficient time for the proper logistical planning and resourcing of operations. The improvisatory nature of its creations also has implications for the lack of clarity of its mandate, especially with regard to peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The 1999 Protocol on Regional Peacekeeping in a bad neighborhood: ECOWAS in peace and security in West Africa Peacekeeping, Conflict Management and Security Mechanism was therefore an attempt to respond to the problems, challenges and opportunities arising from the ECOMOG experience since 1990. However, adoption of the protocol did not have any conceivable impact on the management of the conflicts after 1999. A question raised by many political analysts and media commentators focused on the real reasons that motivated the ECOWAS leadership to venture into the difficult arena of regional peacekeeping and conflict management. This question is at the center of 'why' and 'how' ECOWAS can be effective in regional peace and security issues, in particular, if it is driven by the whims and preferences of the dominant state, Nigeria. A more persuasive reason for the ECOWAS unusual regional 'collective' peacekeeping or 'coalition of willing states' was the threat posed by rebel insurgency to the security and survival of the regimes in the sub-region. Insurgency or guerrilla warfare was a relatively new phenomenon in postCold War West Africa. An alternative to military coups was access to state power and its patrimonial resources. Since the majority of the regimes were of questionable legitimacy and democratic credentials, the rally of ECOWAS leaders under the umbrella of 'regional collective security' and peacekeeping in Liberia was an attempt to discourage the 'power of the Liberian example' and, by the same token, protect and secure the survival of their regimes. The official view was that ECOMOG was acting within its constituted mandate, as provided for in the 1981 defense protocol, by responding to a request from a member state invaded by 'foreign-backed' forces. A more credible reason was the perceived threat to the national security of Nigeria and the implications for its foreign and security policy. The Nigerian president, General Babangida, captured the strategic culture of pro-interventionism in a statement on the Liberian crisis in 1990 when he stated, 'When certain events occur in the sub-region depending on their intensity and magnitude, which are bound to affect Nigeria's politico-military and socio-economic environment, we should not stand by as helpless and hopeless spectators' (Francis 2001). Nigeria's leadership was also motivated by the need to limit, contain and discourage some Francophone countries that were supporting the NPFL rebel insurgency in Liberia. As always looking for an opportunity to demonstrate its benevolent hegemonic leadership in West Africa, the perceived international neglect of Africa also provided

the international environment for Nigeria to develop and put into practice the much-touted 'Try Africa First' approach to conflict management and resolution.

Therefore, in evaluating ECOWAS effectiveness in regional peace and security issues, there are key issues worthy of consideration: the geopolitics of West Africa and its constraints on the development and practice of common foreign and security policies; the leadership role of Nigeria; the role and contribution of extra-regional actors such as the former colonial powers and the UN; and the quality of leadership of both ECOWAS and ECOMOG.

5.7   Recommendations

This study has revealed that regional political divisions were among the more serious problems that ECOWAS faced during its peace enforcement operation in Liberia. Therefore, the following recommendations contribute to the existing body of knowledge in an attempt to enhance the sustainability of peace in Liberia, as well as in Africa as a whole.

There are positive signs that ECOMOG has created awareness among African leaders, intellectuals, military, experts, and the international community that the force is a positive security development that requires some fine-tuning. It is evidence that the right tool for conflict resolution in Africa can be found within Africa itself. With the unity and commitment of African governments, Africa can address its own problems effectively.

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APPENDIX I

A.   Interview guide

Objectives of the study

The objectives of this study are as follows:

1.   Examine the reasons for ECOMOG intervention in Liberia were examined.
2.   ECOMOG intervention has prevented the re-emergence of conflict in Liberia?

Interview Questions

1.   The remote and proximate causes of the Liberian civil war were identified
2.   How did President Samuel Doe's autocratic rule contribute to the ignition of the civil war in Liberia?
3.   What motivated ECOWAS to assume the role of collective security?
4.   Why was ECOMOG deployed?

5.　　Has the ECOMOG intervention prevented the reemergence of conflict in Liberia?

6.　　The challenges faced by ECOMOG in Liberia

7.　　To what extent can we say that ECOWAS has achieved positive peace in Liberia?

8.　　The lessons to be learned from ECOMOG Peace enforcement Operations in Africa

APPENDIX II

B.　　The political map of Liberia

Figure 1: Political map of Liberia (**SOURCE:** https://www.wikipedia.com)