ASSESSING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE NIGERIAN ELECTRICITY REGULATORY COMMISSION IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE

Abstract

Three mutually exclusive interests converge on the independent regulatory model of governance table: the desire of consumers for affordable and sustainable power supply; the quest of investors of sunk and immovable resources to have a return of their investments; and finally the desire of government for peace and social harmony devoid of exploitation and market abuse. In balancing these competing interests, an umpire, the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission, was established to moderate the competing interests. It is designed to be and be seen to be independent of all the players in the value chain in its decision-making processes in order to ginger credibility, accountability, legitimacy and transparency and is also required to act objectively, impartially, and consistently, without conflict of interest, bias or undue influence—in other words, independently. This paper problematizes the institutional design of the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission to ascertain its alignment with the conceptual benchmarks of independence in both form and substance. The paper finds that while the enabling law largely captures the essence of the model, the de facto landscape under which the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission operates is dotted with distortions, misalignments characterized by state and regulatory capture thus betraying its weak independent status and proffers veritable mitigating pathways out of the challenges